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Abstract
We show that the ‘fear’ of globalisation can be rationalised by eco-
nomic theory in the standard AD/AS equilibrium model, if we substitute
the coordinational role of the Auctioneer by an implementation device
based on learning (Guesnerie, 1992). When endowing producers with
a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing
production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic
substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that
‘competitiveness’ matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain ac-
cess to the home market, home producers’ ability to forecast market prices
is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of
their production decisions. A standard open economy exercise shows that
the efficiency gains triggered by increased competition have to be traded-
off against higher uncertainty (a lower likelihood to coordinate upon the
welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium). We interpret it as a new ratio-
nale for the existence of barriers to trade targeting coordination, rather
than protecting mere inefficient sectors or industries (political economy
driven). Finally, we show that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the
desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always ad-
vice free trade.
Keywords: Globalisation, Rational Expectations, Coordination, Com-
mon Knowledge.
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1 Introduction
”...learning is the adjustment mechanism whereby the economy is steered to the
new equilibrium after a structural change.” (Evans and Honkapohja [16], p.81).
It is nowadays well established that the potential benefits of trade liberalisa-
tion come from equalizing the prices of those commodities produced at different
(real) costs across regions. Trade economists perceive borders as ’historical’
distortions to the efficient allocation of scarce ressources by the market, and
therefore compare the associated welfare gains before and after trade liberalisa-
tion. At least since Grandmont and McFadden [18] or Dixit and Norman [11],
[12] published their works, we understand that in the context of the standard
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium paradigm, provided that adequate redistribu-
tional schemes operate inside each region, it is possible to compensate those who
lose from trade and let everyone at least as well as they were in autarky. Con-
fronted with such a prediction, the reluctance to remove existing trade barriers
is perceived by most of the scientific trade community as a paradox1 . Among
the possible solutions to the paradox, political economy driven Governments,
oligopolistic market structures, missing markets, imperfect or missing supra-
national institutions or inadequacy of national redistribution schemes are often
cited2 . Here we propose a new one: the structural changes that trade liber-
alisation triggers exacerbate the ex-ante uncertainty that producers perceive,
rendering them reluctant to accept the free-trade policy ex-ante. An immediate
corollary is that trade barriers, in either the form of a quota or a tariff, will be
preferred because they reduce the uncertainty triggered by an abrupt transition
to free trade.
A recent strand of the trade literature examines intra-industry effects of
international trade in a general equilibrium setup with firm-heterogeneity (see
Bernard et al. [3] or Melitz [27]). There, trade induces a labor reallocation from
least to most productive plants, inducing endogenous entry and exit from the
industry relative to autarky. Although in the simple partial equilibrium model3
upon which we hinge we cannot consider this issue, we still capture the profit
redistribution channel across regions triggered by an increase in competition,
absent from these models. As a by-product, we will provide a rationale for the
controversial notion of ’competitiveness’.
The work proceeds as follows: In section 2 we summarize the main results of
the paper implied by the ’eductive’ learning approach. In section 3, we describe
the linear version of Guesnerie’s [19] model, and his main results relevant to our
work. The reader familiar with his work can directly start in section 4, where we
study the effect of signing a free trade agreement between regions characterized
1Among the myriad of works, see Deardorff [9], Krugman [24] or Rodrik [32].
2See Burguignon et al. [5] for a synthesis.
3From a classical normative point of view, the partial equilibrium framework is a particular
case of a general equilibrium economy for which Dixit and Norman [11] showed the existence
of ex-post transfers that leave everybody better off. However, the effective implementation of
these transfers, from an eductive viewpoint, remains an open question because its existence
modifies the rules of the game, and will therefore alter the strategic behaviour of producers.
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by linear aggregate demand and supply schedules (’linear class’). In section 5, we
compare the expectational coordination criterion to a traditional ex-ante welfare
evaluation of economic integration, to show that a trade-off exists between both.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
Remark: Throughout the work, the words ’local’ versus ’global’ are used
in their standard mathematical meaning, and are not to be confused with ’re-
gional’ versus ’free trade’ or ’open economy’ meanings in economics. Most in-
ternational trade exercises involve comparative statics analysis that are ’global’
mathematically speaking, as they require the comparison of equilibria that need
not be ’topologically close’. As well, the words ’free trade’, ’open economy’ and
’economic integration’ are used interchangeably.
2 Implications of ’Eductive’ Learning for Free
Trade
The only non-standard assumption upon which we rely here is that no Walrasian
Auctioneer will lie behind the price determination process. Rather, we will take
a step back, and adopt a truly decentralized foundation of the competitive equi-
librium developed by Guesnerie [19], [21]. There, infinitesimally small, perfectly
rational and completely informed heterogenous producers realize that the profit
consequences of their individual production decisions depend on an aggregate
of the decisions taken by the rest, confining them to a strategic framework
where they need to form expectations on others’ actions (and expectations)4 .
When producers are able to individually forecast the actual market price, coor-
dinating on a single course of action that confirms the forecast (’expectational
coordination’), the standard competitive equilibrium price as if determined by
a Walrasian Auctioneer prevails. That insight effectively transforms the ’static’
Walrasian framework into a ’dynamic’ competitive one, where the corresponding
equilibrium notion is that of a Perfect Foresight Equilibrium (PFE) in prices,
actions and expectations. Its effective implementation is then guaranteed by
the convergence of a learning process (’eductive’ learning), upon which we rely
to compare equilibria before and after the policy change.
’Eductive’ expectational coordination obtains whenever the learning process
converges to the PFE. Convergence is characterized by a condition on the elas-
ticities of demand and supply isomorphic to the condition under which con-
vergence of ’coweb tatônnement’ obtains, i.e. when a ’high demand elasticity’
and a ’low supply elasticity’ are observed. This condition has a natural inter-
pretation in open economy. When the producers of a particular region gain
access to new markets ceteris paribus (exporting), the new demand function
4This basic framework encompasses the reduced form of standard macroeconomic models
in their non-noisy versions, like the Lucas aggregate supply model or a simple version of the
Cagan inflation model. See Evans and Honkapohja [16] for additional details. As well, it can
be seen as the competitive limit model of a large Cournot game, where producers are ’small’
with respect to the market size. On the latter, see Novshek [30] or Vives [34] for further
details.
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that home producers serve is relatively ’more sensible to price changes’ than it
was before exporting because the relative scarcity of the home produced com-
modity has increased. Effectively, given home and foreign demand, now the
price ’depends less’ on the quantities produced by home producers, relaxing
the ’strategic component’ in home producers’ forecasts and therefore tempering
producers’ strategic uncertainty. Exporting then favours expectational coordi-
nation, because producers’ forecasts of the market price become more reliable,
and so will their expected profits. This refers to the ’stabilizing’ role of a high
demand elasticity. However, opening the home market to foreign producers
ceteris paribus, will have the opposite effect. As home demand is now served
by both home and foreign producers, the relative abundance of the commodity
increases, and so does the ’sensibility of supply to price changes’. Since given
demand, the final price depends on the quantities produced now by both home
and foreign producers, producers’ decisions become more interdependent in a
truly strategical sense. Therefore, home import penetration undermines the
ability of home producers to forecast the price that will prevail in the market,
and therefore the associated profits relative to autarky (’competitiveness’ mat-
ters). This refers to the ’destabilizing role of a high supply elasticity’. Free
trade, by combining both, will have an ambiguous net effect on the reliability
of producers’ forecasts, and thus on coordination.
The main result of this paper relies on the adverse impact of free trade on the
ability of producers to forecast the equilibrium price5 when differences across
regions in the valuation of the produced commodity or in price-varying supply
and demand elasticities prevail. Through enhanced competition, free trade cre-
ates a redistributional conflict between producers across regions, leading some
to expect higher prices and others, lower ones relative to autarky (direct effect).
Under the aforementioned conditions, producers operating with diferent costs
respond to the policy induced expected price changes in proportion, thereby
introducing additional heterogeneity in the magnitude of the responses to the
initial redistributional conflict (indirect effect). Overall, coupling both the direct
and the indirect effect, the reliability of producers’ free trade equilibrium price
forecasts is unambiguously undermined, exacerbating the uncertainty producers
were confronted with in autarky6 . Intuitively, producers need to forecast both
the equilibrium price that will prevail after the policy change (direct effect) and
the impact of others’ reactions on others’ equilibrium price forecasts (indirect
effect). The impact of others’ reactions on others’ forecasts will depend on the
5Examples of the literature on firm dynamics with heterogeneous firms, such as Hopenhayn
[22] or Melitz [27], assume that firms are uncertain about their productivity and face sunk
entry costs, so that they have to take forward looking decisions anticipating future probabilities
of exit. Both assume that firms correctly anticipate the stationary equilibrium productivity
probability distribution. In this work we study the conditions under which producers can
actually learn the equilibrium probability distribution.
6 In the class of models considered, Guesnerie [21] convincingly argues that although strate-
gic substituabilities (or complementarities) determine the sign of agents’ reactions to expecta-
tions, what is instrumental for expectational coordination is the magnitude of these reactions.
As expectational coordination is governed by a condition on first derivatives, the magnitude
of the reactions to the policy change is measured by changes in first derivatives.
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magnitude of their individual responses to the anticipated changes of the free
trade equilibrium price. Then because of free trade, spurious price volatility and
multiple equilibria may arise. Summarizing, since producers’s (real) costs differ
across regions, standard efficiency gains justify a free trade policy. But since the
plausibility of coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium
price is also undermined, embracing free-trade from an ex-ante viewpoint needs
not follow7 . Notice that the main argument of this work encompasses rather
than excludes the political economy motiviation (i.e. the ex-ante certainty of
losing because of free-trade), and may thus provide a microfundation for it.
Finally we compare the expectational coordination criterion with a more
traditional gains-from-trade criterion from an ex-ante viewpoint8 . In the class
of models considered, the net welfare gain from free trade increases the more
heterogeneous the signing regions are. Given identical demands across regions,
the gains are larger the larger the differences in average production costs. But
the larger the differences in the latter, the more heterogeneous the supply re-
sponses will be to the free trade policy induced price change, and the lower the
probability of expectational coordination.
3 Preliminaries
If one is to recognize that economics is not a natural science because economic
agents make forecasts that influence the time path of the system, it becomes
crucial to understand how do economic agents form expectations. Faced with
this problem, the modern macroeconomics literature has focused on how do
economic agents ’learn’. A strand of the ’learning’ literature views economic
agents as statisticians who use sophisticated forecasting techniques to estimate
the parameters of the law of motion governing the economic system, and on
the same time taking into account that the use of these techniques shapes the
motion itself. Stated otherwise, available information on the evolution of the
economic system is at best incomplete even to the most sophisticated economic
agent9 . The question is then whether the estimated motion would (at least)
7Notice that there is also a sense in which the eductive viewpoint offers new hope in
overcoming some of the old arguments for coordination at the international level, as it provides
conditions favouring coordination in the absence of explicit coordinating institutions.
8The reason we adopt an ex-ante viewpoint (before effective integration takes place) is
that the appropriate criterion would necessitate computing producers’ welfare when the set of
equilibria is an interval of the real line, which is beyond the scope of the present work. Allen et
al. [1] address this problem in generic competitive exchange economies with countably many
competitive equilibria. Here we will have uncountably many.
9Manski [25] presents two serious reasons in support of the incomplete information work-
horse assumption: empirical data captures the result of choices, and not the expectations of
decision makers when confronted with choices. Second, one cannot expect to recover objective
evidence on expectations because of the selection bias (logical unobservability of counterfac-
tual outcomes). By these reasons, he supports data collection on expectations. Recent work
by Evans and Honkapohja [16] along the lines of adaptive learning, solves the design of optimal
monetary policies when observed data on private agents’ expectations are incorporated in the
policy maker’s optimal monetary rule.
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asymptotically approximate the motion consistent with agents forming a ratio-
nal expectation. This is called the ’adaptive approach to learning’ (or evolutive
learning) and has a long lasting tradition.
A different strand of the literature upon which we hinge here, is the ’educ-
tive approach to learning’. This second modern approach admits that agents
are rational and know the whole structure of the model describing the evolution
of the system. Nevertheless, agents form expectations that need not coincide:
Bernheim [4] and Pearce [31] show that rationality of the players and complete
information of the game being played, even when they are ’common knowledge’
(CK), do not imply the Nash equilibrium outcome but a different solution con-
cept called a ’rationalizable equilibrium’ (10). Guesnerie [19] applies the notion
of rationalizability to a version of the standard Muthian model, to show that
CK of rationality and of the model are not enough for them to always coor-
dinate their expectations on the unique REE solution defined by Muth [29].
In this sense, since the definition of a REE imposes expectational coordina-
tion, the eductive approach looks for structural conditions under which isolated
independent agents’ subjective expectations end up coordinating upon a REE.
In this section we present Guesnerie’s [19] version of Muth’s model and his
main results relevant to our work. The equilibrium concept will be a ’Rational-
izable Expectations Equilibrium’, as defined in Guesnerie [19],[21].
3.1 The Model and the Equilibrium Concept
The model describes a two-period partial-competitive equilibrium of an agri-
cultural commodity economy. A continuum of profit maximizing risk-neutral
farmers f ∈ [0, 1] with a differentiable and strictly convex cost function C(q, f)
must decide the quantity q to be produced a period in advance on selling, given
a predictable demand D(p), assumed to be downward sloping D′(p) < 0 and
resulting from the aggregation of a continuum of identical consumers indexed
by c, D(p) =
∫
D(p, c)dc. The effective equilibrium price is unknown because it
depends on what other farmers will decide to produce. Therefore, the supply
of each producer will also depend on the probability distribution of the price,
denoted dµ(p) (11). Since farmers are risk neutral, their production decisions
will only depend on the expectation of the price Ep =
∫
pdµ(p) :
S[p, dµ(p), f ] = (∂qCf )−1 [p, dµ(p)] ∈ argmaxq
∫
[pq −C(q, f)]dµ(p)
Putting the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1], aggregate supply will be given by:
S[p, dµ(p)] =
∫
S[p, dµ(p), f ]df
10Tan and Werlang [33] transform a non-cooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem
where the uncertainty faced by a given agent is formed by the actions, priors over actions,
priors over priors over actions, etc. of the other agents. They show that common knowledge
of the actual strategies to be played is only necessary for players to play Nash strategies.
11Strictly speaking, the probability distribution differs across farmers, i.e. dµ(p, f).
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Under the above assumptions, the unique Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(REE) price p of this model will be given by the equality of aggregate supply
and aggregate demand in expectation, computed using dµ(p, f) = dµ(p),∀f (i.e.
farmers form rational expectations):
p = D−1(S[p, dµ(p)])
Since there is no noise, the REE price p is called a Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
(PFE). Following Evans’ [15] assertion according to which a REE is in the class
of Nash equilibria in actions and beliefs (NE), p is also the unique NE12 .
Building upon the game-theoretic concept of ’rationalizability’, Guesnerie
[19] defines the ’Rationalizable-Expectations Equilibria’ as the limits of an it-
erative process which views the farmers’ situation as a complete information
normal-form game where the set of players is the set of farmers, and their
strategies, the farmers’ individual quantities of the crop sf ∈ Sf ,∀f (13). Each
farmer’s payoff function is his profit function:
{
D−1
(∫
sf ′df ′
)}
sf −C (sf , f)
For each given profile of strategies of the other farmers (sf ′)f ′∈[0,1] , the best
response of farmer f is the function that maximizes the above expression. The
concept of a ’rationalizable solution’ R exhausts the implications of individual
rationality and common knowledge (CK) of rationality and of the model when
considered as an iterative process taking place in ’mental time’ τ (in each of the
farmers’ heads) following which non-best response strategies are progressively
eliminated14 . Where does this iterative process start? At an initial restriction
(τ = 0) on the players’ strategy sets called anchorage assumption, which is either
naturally embedded on the model at stark or exogenously given15 . In either case,
it is also CK. This iterative process of elimination of non-best responses will lead
somewhere, defined by Pearce [31] and Bernheim [4] as a rationalizable solution
R :
R = (sf ′)f ′ ∈
∏
f ′
(∩∞τ=0S(τ , f ′))
12For an explicit formulation of this assertion in the class of models under consideration,
see Desgranges and Gauthier [10], or more recently Jara [23].
13Guesnerie [19] points out (p.1258) that since the supply function is a one-to-one corre-
spondence of the expected market clearing price, the strategies are also the individual price
expectations.
14Observe that a CK assumption is absolutely rational in a strategic context: when an
individual recognizes that self-interest depends on others’ actions, his conjectures on others’
behaviour are essential to the effective consecution of self intentions. The conjectures are the
subjective expectations that each agent forms independently of others. And if one is to form
conjectures about others’ behaviour, it seems natural to recognize that others form conjectures
as well in the same way as one does. Then the agent must conjecture about others’ actions
and conjectures. This process can go several steps further, triggered by the CK behavioural
assumption.
15At this stage, it is to be understood not as an exogenous intervention, but as a robustness
test that any REE should pass for it to be ’implementable’ through the iterative process
of learning that is being described. If the REE fails to pass the test, then exogenous price
restrictions can be introduced by an exogenous third party, to achieve coordination. See
Guesnerie [21] for further details.
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Whenever the sets of best response strategies S(τ , f) shrink through ’mental
time’ τ to a singleton, farmers instantaneously coordinate on a unique (pro-
duction) strategy. Because of the one-to-one correspondence between prices
and quantities, that production decision will correspond to a price expectation.
As market clearing is CK, that price expectation must clear the market, and
therefore coincide with the actual equilibrium price. As that equilibrium price
is the unique rationalizable solution, and because the Nash solution is always
rationalizable, the equilibrium price must coincide with the Nash equilibrium
of the normal-form game. However, when the sets of farmers’ best responses
do not collapse to a singleton, full coordination is not achieved. Although the
Nash equilibrium will be included in, farmers equivalently consider each of the
possible rationalizable strategies as an equilibrium production decision, corre-
sponding each to an equilibrium price expectation16 .
Guesnerie [19] otains structural conditions under which, without assuming
that farmers held rational expectations, the Rationalizable Expectations Equilib-
rium of the farmers’ normal-form game described above coincides with the REE
(or NE). The unique Rationalizable Expectations Equilibrium is called by him a
’Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium’ (SREE) or ’unique rationalizable
expectations equilibrium’.
3.2 The Linear Specification
Consider the (non-noisy) linear version of the model presented above. The
demand function for the crop is given by:
D(p) =
{
A−Bp if 0 ≤ p ≤ AB ≡ pmax0
0 otherwise
and C(q, f) = q22Cf , f ∈ [0, 1] constitutes the farmers’ cost function. Under this
linear specification, the PFE price is given by17 :
p = AB +C : C ≡
∫
Cfdf
The game that farmers play has a set of rationalizable strategies given by the
limit of the iterative process of elimination of non-best responses from the strat-
16 It is important to stress that to compute the rationalizable equilibrium, the subjective
price probability distribution and the cost function of every agent as well as market clear-
ing are CK in the model considered. The work by Desgranges and Gauthier [10] makes
clear the distinction between strategic uncertainty and model uncertainty in the linear noisy
one-dimensional version of Guesnerie [19] presented here: they show that whenever the CK
assumption on farmers’ subjective probability beliefs is violated, the success of the iterative
process is compromised.
17 It can be checked that with the encompassing definition of the demand function D(p) =
max {A−Bp, 0} , with pmax0 ≡ minD−1(0) = AB , the PFE price equals pmax0 when total
supply is zero.
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egy sets of farmers, depicted in figure 1:
Q
p
p
B
Apmax0 =
Q
min
1p
max
2p...p
min
3
A
0
CpS(p) =BpAD(p) −=
Figure 1: Eductive Learning
The iteration is triggered by the CK of individual rationality and of the model,
since the anchorage assumption is embedded in the structure of the model: at
virtual time τ = 0 each farmer f recognizes that equilibrium prices must be con-
tained in the interval [0, pmax0 ] : pmax0 ≡ AB (maximum willingness to pay) since
D(pmax0 ) = 0. Therefore each farmer deletes from his strategy set any quantity
sf ≥ S(pmax0 , f) defining the set S(0, f) = [0, S(pmax0 , f)] ,∀f. At τ = 1 since
each farmer knows that other farmers are rational as well, each farmer knows
that the others ∀f ′ = f will play strategies in their sets S(0, f ′), concluding that
total supply cannot be greater than S(pmax0 ) =
∫
S(pmax0 , f ′)df ′. From the mar-
ket clearing equation being common knowledge, each farmer deduces that the
equilibrium price cannot be smaller than pmin1 = D−1 [S(pmax0 )] and proceeds
to delete from his strategy set S(0, f) all these quantities that are smaller than
sf ≤ S(pmin1 , f). The new set of strategies S(1, f) =
[
S(pmin1 , f), S(pmax0 , f)
]
for every farmer f recognizes that equilibrium prices must be contained in the
interval [pmin1 , pmax0 ]. Now at τ = 2 each farmer recognizes that the other farm-
ers ∀f ′ = f know that he knows, and therefore play also strategies in the set
S(1, f ′)... and so on. Intuitively, each step τ corresponds to a further logical
deduction step progressively exhausting the implications of the CK behavioural
assumption and of the initial anchorage restriction triggering it (pmax0 ). This
process leads each farmer to individually reproduce in their heads the following
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sequence of (expected) prices (pτ )∞τ=0:
pmin1 = D−1 [S(pmax0 )] =
A
B −
C
Bp
max
0
pmax2 =
A
B −
C
Bp
min
1 =
A
B
[
1 +
(
−CB
)]
+
(
−CB
)2
pmax0
...
pτ =
A
B −
C
Bpτ−1 =
A
B
[m=τ−1∑
m=0
(
−CB
)m]
+
(
−CB
)τ
pmax0
If this sequence has a limit, from the rationalizable solution concept, it must be
the Nash equilibrium of the game p. We reproduce Guesnerie’s [19] proposition
1, which establishes conditions under which farmers are able to coordinate on
the PFE price p. Under those conditions the equilibrium is a SREE:
Proposition 1 (Guesnerie, [19]) (i) B > C ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) B ≤
C ⇐⇒ p is not an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equi-
libria comprises the segment [0, pmax0 ]
The conclusion of proposition 1 can be read as ’a low elasticity of aggregate
supply (small C) and a high elasticity of demand (large B) favour expectational
coordination from an eductive viewpoint’ (case depicted in Figure 1). Intu-
itively, it can be read also as ’producers’ forecasts are more reliable the lower
the sensibility of their decisions to others’ forecasts’. Then under condition (i),
the set of farmers’ rationalizable strategies that are the rationalizable solution
R of the farmers’ game is:
R = (sf ′)f′ ∈
∏
f′
(∩∞τ=0S(τ , f ′)) =
∏
f ′
S(∞, f ′) = (S(p, f ′))f ′
If however condition (ii) is satisfied, then the price sequence (pτ )∞τ=0 does not
have a limit and the set of farmers’ rationalizable strategies that are a rational-
izable solution R of the farmers’ game is:
R = (sf ′)f ′ ∈
∏
f′
(∩∞τ=0S(τ , f ′)) =
∏
f ′
S(0, f ′) = ×f′ [0, S(pmax0 , f ′)]
In situations like (ii), Guesnerie [19] identifies the minimal set of conditions
sufficient to achieve full coordination, calling them ’credible price restrictions’
or ’exogenous price interventions’, implemented by an exogenous third party.
In this particular example, the model definition embeds the initial anchorage
assumption (pmax0 , denoted p0 heretofore) which is not ’close’ to the equilibrium
outcome. Then, under the (i) condition, the equilibrium price is ’Globally SR’.
In general, when no such natural embedding exists, the anchorage assumption is
exogenously specified. When the model considered is non-linear, the anchorage
assumption is settled ’close’ to the REE under scrutiny and the analysis is local
(because there might exist multiple equilibria, which we assume locally deter-
minate). Then, when the iterative process converges, the equilibrium is called
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’Locally SR’ or ’SR with respect to the CK anchorage assumption’. When the
iterative process does not converge, the ’credible price restrictions’ or ’exoge-
nous price interventions’ qualify the above definitions to be ’SR with respect
to these restrictions’. For non-linear versions of the economy under study, the
iterative process describing farmers’ eductive learning can be characterized by
the second iterate of the cobweb function ϕ(.) ≡ D−1 [S(.)] , ϕ2(.) ≡ ϕ [ϕ(.)] ,
conditional to the CK initial restriction18 , denoted V (p):
Proposition 2 (Guesnerie [19]):
(i) If |ϕ′(p)| < 1 ⇔ S′(p) < |D′ [S(p)]| ,∀p and if there is a credible price
restriction (floor or ceiling), then p is a SREE subject to the given price restric-
tion.
(ii) If |ϕ′(p)| < 1, there is a credible price restriction (floor or ceiling) s.t. p
is a SREE subject to the given price restriction.
(iii) If |ϕ′(p)| > 1, and if the graph of ϕ2(.) intersects transversely the 45-
degree line more than once, then there is a credible price restriction (floor or
ceiling) s.t.[pc1, pc2] is the set of rationalizable-expectations equilibrium prices
subject to the given price restriction, where pc2 = ϕ(pc1), ϕ2(pct) = pct, t = 1, 2
define cycles of order two of the cobweb function (19),(20).
The results in the next section illustrate some of these cases.
4 A Simple Linear Model of Trade and Expec-
tational Stability
Most of the international trade literature concerns comparative statics exer-
cises on the effect of changes in the production structure (factor endowments or
production techniques) on the equilibrium outcome operated via the mobility
of commodities or factors. The consequences on factors and commodity prices
are corollaries of the comparative statics exercise under the same or alternative
restrictions. However, they all necessitate at least two commodities for the ex-
change channel to operate. In the class of agricultural economies considered,
there is only a single homogenoeus crop produced at different costs depend-
ing on farmers’ technologies. From the expectational stability viewpoint, the
open economy device introduces heterogeneity in the autarkic economy, which
according to Guesnerie’s [21] general intuition (GI2), should undermine its ex-
pectational stability. A related way to understand the exercise is to assume
that non-increasing returns to scale producers play a large oligopoly game with
strategic substituabilities, the equilibrium of which is globally perturbed by the
18Subject to the condition that lim
τ→∞
(
ϕ2
)τ (p0) = limτ→∞ϕ
2τ (p0) = p, p0 ∈ V (p)
19For a proof of the general statement which includes cases (ii) of proposition 1 and this
case (iii), see Bernheim [4], proposition 5.2., part (a).
20This is trivially true if [pc1, pc2] ⊂ V (p). If however V (p) ⊆ [pc1, pc2] , the learning
dynamics will also converge to the set [pc1, pc2] . In that case, the CK anchorage assumption
must be understood not as a ’hypothetical’ restriction, but as resulting from a non-enforceable
’exogenous price intervention’.
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integration policy. The question would then be whether the dominance solv-
ability of the autarkic equilibrium is robust to the introduction of heterogeneity
(amenable to an open economy device)21 .
Although the answer will be related to the factors favouring coordination
upon the integrating regions autarkic equilibrium (propositions 1,2 above), the
answer is not immediate. Aggregating demand curves in partial equilibrium
results in a more elastic demand curve, which favours expectational coordi-
nation according to proposition 1. However, aggregation of supply curves is
detrimental to eductive coordination22 . As economic integration entails both, it
does not necessarily undermine the coordinational ability of farmers. Actually,
mere replication of the Home economy will not affect its degree of expectational
stability.
To see it, consider the linear class of agricultural economies characterized
by linear aggregate demand and supply schedules and index them by n ∈ N =
{1...N} . In each, a set of risk neutral farmers fn ∈ [0, 1] produce with strictly
convex cost structures C(sfn , fn, n) = (sfn )
2
2Cfn(n)
to serve a continuum of con-
sumers represented by a (weakly) decreasing aggregate linear demand func-
tion Dn(p) ≡
∫
Dn(p, cn)dcn = max {An −Bnp, 0} (23). Suppose that the N
economies in the class are identical and decide to integrate (fix n = n0,∀n and
call economy n0 the Home economy). The aggregate supply of the global agri-
cultural economy will be given by the sum of the aggregate supply functions of
each of the N regions, S(p) =∑Nn=1 Sn(p) = N
∫
Cfn0 (n0)pdfn0 = NSn0(p). So
will the aggregate demand: D(p) =∑Nn=1Dn(p) = NDn0(p). The PFE-price is
then given by:
p = pn0 =
An0
Bn0 +Cn0
And the conditions under which farmers will be able to individually predict the
PFE-price p coincide with those of proposition 1:
Proposition 3 (i) Bn0 > Cn0 ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) Bn0 ≤ Cn0 ⇐⇒ p is not
an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria comprises
the segment [0, p0] . (24)
The detrimental effect of increasing the number of farmers on the eductive
stability of the equilibrium: Consider our Home economy n = n0 and suppose
that in addition to the Home farmers those from the rest of the regions N\ {n0}
can also sell in the Home crop market. Denote by CΣ = Cn0 +
∑
n=n0 Cn the
aggregate cost parameter characterizing the total supply of the crop. The PFE
price is p = An0Bn0+CΣ , which when:
21See Vives [34] ch.4.4. for a synthetic presentation of large Cournot markets.
22As Vives [34] discusses for large Cournot games, the effect parallels adverse impact on
dominance solvability of the equilibrium from increasing the number of producers without
replicating the demand.
23Throughout we assume that An, Bn > 0, ∀n ∈N. Notice that p0 ≡ minD−1n (0) = AnBn .24This proposition extends to the integration of N identical non-linear agricultural
economies under some conditions. See proposition 9 in Calvo-Pardo [6].
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Proposition 4 (i) Bn0 > CΣ ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) Bn0 ≤ CΣ ⇐⇒ p is not
an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria comprises
the segment [0, p0]. (iii) Increasing the number of farmers is detrimental to
expectational stability. (25)
Proof. Compute the limit lim
τ→+∞
pτ of the price sequence:
pτ =
An0
Bn0


1−
(
− CΣBn0
)τ
1−
(
− CΣBn0
)

+
(
− CΣBn0
)τ
p0
Part (iii) follows trivially from the definition of CΣ, (i) and noting that repli-
cating the supply side of the Home economy makes CΣ = NCn0 .
Part (iii) states that the set of rationalizable solutions of the Home econ-
omy Rn0 will be strictly included in the set of rationalizable solutions of the
regionally integrated agricultural economy R of proposition 3: R ⊃ Rn0 . As
the aggregation of supply curves increases the elasticity of the resulting aggre-
gate supply schedule (In terms of figure 1: keep aggregate demand constant
and rotate counter-clockwise aggregate supply), each farmer’s quantity choice
becomes more sensible to other farmers’ choices, rendering their predictions of
the market clearing price less accurate (for sufficient entry, the depicted educ-
tive process does not converge). Intuitively, as new entrants gain access to the
Home market, the relative scarcity of the home produced commodity decreases,
intensifying competition and lowering the price and profits of home producers,
compelling their forecasts to increasingly rely on what do others expect, thus
undermining expectational coordination. Therefore, opening the Home market
to foreign competitors is destabilizing, in the precise sense of producers’ under-
mined ability to forecast the market clearing price, and hence, their profits. It
is in this sense that ’competitiveness’ matters: the proposition is silent about
the relative efficiency of the new foreign entrants, i.e. foreign entry will be
destabilizing even if producing at higher real average costs (in terms of Home
purchasing power, as we abstract from aggregate demand changes). Therefore,
it is related to a pure scarcity effect relative to autarky, that exists because
entry is exogenous.
Replication of Home demand keeping supply constant, highlights the bene-
ficial role of the demand elasticity on the expectational stability of the resulting
PFE price, given by p = NAn0NBn0+Cn0 . Then when:
Proposition 5 (i) NBn0 > Cn0 ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) NBn0 ≤ Cn0 ⇐⇒
p is not an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria
25Although this proposition as such does not extend to general non-linear schedules, a
stronger version of it does. Section 5 in Calvo-Pardo [6] discusses it, and proposition 10(i)
contains the results. The problem is connected to the convexity of demand, which in usual
Cournot games, prevents the players’ reaction functions from being downward sloping, or,
players’ strategies from being strategic substitutes. See Vives [34], chapters 2 and 4 for a
comprehensive explanation.
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comprises the segment [0, p0]. (iii) Increasing the number of consumers favours
stability. (26)
Proof. For parts (i),(ii) compute the limit lim
τ→+∞
pτ of the price sequence
in the previous proposition after replacing
(
− CΣBn0
)
by
(
− Cn0NBn0
)
. Part (iii)
follows from (i) and NBn0 > Bn0 .
Intuitively, part (iii) states that as the number of consumers increases, the
demand becomes more sensible to price changes because the relative scarcity
of the home produced commodity increases. Then, higher prices and profits
are expected relative to autarky, relaxing home competition and reducing the
weight of the strategic component in producers’ forecasts (forecasting others’
forecasts), which favours expectational coordination (in figure 1: keep aggregate
supply constant and rotate clockwise aggregate demand; the depicted eductive
process is more likely to converge). Therefore, opening new markets for the
Home producers is stabilizing, in the precise sense that producers’ expectations
become more reliable27 .
4.1 From Global to Local Stability Conditions
In the class of linear economies considered, the anchorage assumption is embed-
ded in the model (p0 = AnBn ,∀n) and ’global’, in the sense that it is not ’close’to the equilibrium. The same is true for the PFE price of the economically in-
tegrated region, provided that the consumers of different regions value the crop
’similarly’, i.e. provided that consumers’ maximal willingness to pay is identical
across regions: AnBn =
An′
Bn′
,∀n, n′ ∈ N.
With the same notation as previously, we define the regionally integrated de-
mand and supply by D(p) = max {AΣ −BΣp, 0} and S(p) = CΣp, respectively.
Then the free trade PFE price is:
D(p) = S(p)⇐⇒ p = AΣBΣ +CΣ
and will be expectationally stable if:
Proposition 6 Assuming that AnBn =
An′
Bn′
,∀n, n′ ∈N, then: (i) BΣ > CΣ ⇐⇒ p
is an SREE. (ii) BΣ ≤ CΣ ⇐⇒ p is not an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-
expectations price equilibria comprises the segment [0, p0] : p0 = AΣBΣ . (iii) The
regional integration of N autarkically expectationally stable economies is expec-
tationally stable, but the converse is false.
26Although this proposition as such does not extend to general non-linear schedules, a
stronger version of it does. Section 5 in Calvo-Pardo [6] discusses it, and proposition 10(ii)
contains the results. See F.N. 25 for the details.
27Proposition 5 becomes the exact analogue of proposition 4, defining D(p) =
max
{∑
n(An −Bnp), 0
}
≡ max {AΣ −BΣp, 0} and imposing the additional condition AnBn =
An′
Bn′
,∀n, n′ ∈ N. The latter condition imposes the equality of the maximal willingnesses to
pay for the crop across regions, and its role on the expectational stability of the free trade
equilibrium price is examined in the next two subsections.
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Proof. See appendix 1.
Intuitively, part (iii) states that it is not regional integration per se what un-
dermines expectational coordination, but the integration with expectationally
unstable regions. And even then, if the set of stable economies is sufficiently
stable, for an autarkically unstable region economic integration can favour ex-
pectational coordination, against Guesnerie’s [21] general intuition (GI2), i.e.
that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational coordination28 .
However, removing the condition of equality of maximal willingnesses to pay
in proposition 6 results in a non-linear (piece-wise linear) aggregate demand
under free trade, rendering piece-wise linear the cobweb characterization of the
eductive learning process29 , with two main consequences: First, from the com-
parison of Guesnerie’s [19] propositions 1 and 2, the necessity of an ’exogenous
price intervention’ is more stringent if expectational coordination is to be main-
tained at the global level30 . Second, conditions for its convergence are given
by proposition 2. There, expectational stability is secluded by resorting to a
local analysis (setting p0 ’close’ to p), which poses a problem for our exercise
since the CK anchorage assumption is naturally embedded in the model and
not necessarily ’close’ to the PFE (given by the maximum willigness to pay
across regions, i.e. p0 = maxn
An
Bn , n ∈N)
31 . There is then a conflict between the
naturally embedded CK anchorage assumption (denoted p0) and the ’wishful’
CK anchorage assumption for the study of non-linear models (denote it by p′0,
and set p′0 ’close’ to p), as exemplified in the following two figures:
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28The last subsection qualifies this conclusion.
29Notice that in autarky, the coweb characterization of the eductive process is linear.
30This is reminiscent of the traditional need to coordinate regional social planners at the
open economy level to fulfill pre-trade national goals. It can then be understood as a new
’rationale’ justifying an exogenous intervention after integration. We however leave for future
work the characterization of the instruments and the study of their effective implementation
in the current framework.
31This is the class of inconsistent situations adduced to by Guesnerie [21], case I.2.(i).
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In figure 2 the global ’expectational stability test’ (starting in p0) fails and
nevertheless the PFE price is locally expectationally stable (starting in p′0), i.e.
depicts proposition 2(ii). In figure 3, the global ’expectational stability test’
is passed (starting in p0), although the PFE price is locally expectationally
unstable (starting in p′0). Figure 3 illustrates proposition 2(iii). Notice that
both regions are expectationally stable in autarky. In the next subsection we
fully develop a two-region example and extend proposition 6 to the case where
condition AnBn =
An′
Bn′
,∀n, n′ ∈N does not hold.
4.2 A Robust Example
Consider the regional integration of two economies n = {1, 2} in the linear class
N, such that A2B2 ≥
A1
B1 (
32). Accordingly, and from the definition of regional
demands, pn0 ≡ minD−1n (0) = AnBn , n = 1, 2. Keeping the same notation, afterintegration farmers’ demand will be D(p) =∑nDn(p)1{p≤pn0}, where 1{p≤pn0}
denotes the standard indicator function, taking value 1 only if the n-region
consumers can afford to buy the crop at price p, and zero otherwise33 . Then,
the PFE price p will be given by:
p = max
{ AΣ
BΣ +CΣ
, A2B2 +CΣ
}
Figues 4 and 5 below build upon the case depicted in figure 3. The PFE price
is represented in figure 4 as a function of the aggregate supply cost parameter
CΣ, p(CΣ) = max
{
p1(CΣ), p2(CΣ)
}
, corresponding to the above expressions.
We have parameterized the difference in the maximal willingnesses to pay by
CΣ = A2
[
B1
A1 −
B2
A2
]
. We can see that the PFE price changes for values of the
aggregate supply cost parameter above and below CΣ. Values of CΣ above CΣ
indicate that both regional markets will be served after integration, whereas
values below indicate that only the highest valuation region will be served (n =
2, given our assumptions). When CΣ = 0 maximal willingnesses to pay are
32We will assume throughout that the region with a relatively more elastic demand will
have the lower maximal willigness to pay for the crop, i.e. A1 ≥ ... ≥ AN > 0 and B1 ≥ ... ≥
BN > 0. Then when n = {1, 2} , minn An = A2 and minn Bn = B2. These assumptions can be
dispensed with and the conclusions still hold.
33 In this particular example, we can alternatively characterize the demand function as
D(p) = max {AΣ −BΣp, A2 −B2p, 0} .
16
equal across regions (proposition 6).
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The learning dynamics of the regional integration PFE price are characterized
by the piece-wise linear cobweb function ϕ(p) ≡ D−1 [S(p)], with the following
analytic form34 :
ϕ(p;CΣ) = max
{
ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ), ϕ2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ)
}
=
{
ϕ2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ) if p ≤ pi
ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ) if p ≥ pi
Where ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ) = AΣBΣ −
CΣ
BΣ p coincides with the linear cobweb function
characterizing the learning dynamics when the condition A1B1 =
A2
B2 ⇐⇒ CΣ = 0
is satisfied, while ϕ2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ) = A2B2 −
CΣ
B2 p corresponds to the case in which
A2
B2 ≥
A1
B1 and CΣ ≤ CΣ. Therefore, when
A2
B2 ≥
A1
B1 but CΣ ≥ CΣ, the conclusionsof proposition 6 apply even if maximal willingnesses to pay across regions differ.
Finally, pi is the price at which both functions ϕ1(.), ϕ2(.) intersect (35).
In figure 5 below, we have depicted in solid black the cobweb function ϕ(.)
when A2B2 ≥
A1
B1 and CΣ ≤ CΣ; i.e.only region 2 consumers will be able to afford
the consumption of the crop at the prevailing free trade PFE price p. Notice
that the conclusions of proposition 6 do not hold: the global ’expectational
stability test’ is satisfied (starting at p0), but the PFE price is locally expecta-
tionally unstable (starting at p′0). When the economy under study is non-linear,
proposition 2 above provides conclusions on the basis of the second iterate of
34That ϕ′(.) ≤ 0 and ϕ(p) = p are general properties of the cobweb function in the class of
economies under study. For a proof, the reader can consult appendix 1 in Calvo-Pardo [6].
35For the derivation of the cobweb function and the expression of the intersection price, see
appendix 1 in Calvo-Pardo [6].
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the cobweb function ϕ2(.), given by36 :
ϕ2(p) =



(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2) (p) if p ≤ piinf
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1) (p)1{piinf=pi} + (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2) (p)1{piinf=pi′} if p ∈
(
piinf , pisup
)
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1) (p) if p ≥ pisup
Where pi′ denotes a second intersecting price37 satisfying ϕ1
[
ϕ(pi′)
]
= ϕ2
[
ϕ(pi′)
]
.
We define38 piinf = max
{
min
{
pi′, pi
}
, p′1
}
and pisup = min
{
max
{
pi′, pi
}
, p∞
}
,
which constitute the two non-differentiability points of the piece-wise linear func-
tion ϕ2(.). Finally 1{piinf=pi} takes value 1 if p
i
inf = pi and 0 otherwise. ϕ2(.)
is depicted in figure 5 as the double-solid piece-wise linear curve -for the pa-
rameters considered, its shape describes proposition 2(iii)-. ϕ2(.) displays the
following properties: it is monotonically increasing, satisfies ϕ2(p) = ϕ [ϕ(p)] =
ϕ(p) = p, and for the particular parameterization represented in figure 5, the
two non-differentiability points are given by pi′ > pi = min
n
An
Bn =
A1
B1 .
1
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Figure 5 also illustrates the two main consequences adduced to: First, even if
both regions were expectationally stable before integration, the resulting PFE
price is ’expectationally unstable’ after integration, in line with the intuition
that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational coordination. Second, the em-
bedded anchorage assumption p0 = maxn
An
Bn =
A2
B2 is not ’local’ and the learning
36Notice that the learning dynamics characterized by it adopt the form of a functional piece-
wise linear difference equation. See in Calvo-Pardo [6] appendices 2 for the derivation, and 3
for its properties, respectively.
37See appendix 2 in Calvo-Pardo [6] for its derivation, explicit formulation and properties
1-5.
38See observation 2 in appendix 2 of Calvo-Pardo [6] for the definitions of p′1, p∞.
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process converges to the set [pc1, pc2] of rationalizable-expectations equilibria,
containing p. If the ’local’ approach had been adopted instead, the initial price
restriction (denoted p′0), would have been set in a neighbourhood of the PFE,
N(p) = (p− , p+ ) , and the learning dynamics would diverge from p, but
converged to [pc1, pc2] .
The most salient result is then:
Proposition 7 Set N = {1, 2} . If CΣ ≥ CΣ the results of proposition 6 extend
to the case where ∃n, n′ ∈ N :AnBn =
An′
Bn′
. If however CΣ < CΣ then even if both
economies were autarkically expectationally stable, the global equilibrium price
can end up being unstable.
Proof. (See the results in Table A1.1 in appendix 1, and the corresponding
proofs in appendix 4 of Calvo-Pardo [6])
Intuitively, a large disparity in consumers’ regional valuations renders farm-
ers’ forecasts increasingly unreliable because it renders a ’market disruption’
phenomenon more likely: If as a result of regional integration the PFE price is
’too high’, the consumers from the low-valuation region will be excluded (’mar-
ket disruption’) with the adverse net effect of a pure increase in the number of
Home farmers’ competitors, studied in proposition 4.
The next proposition generalizes this result to the regional integration of
N economies in the linear class, such that ∃n, n′ ∈ N :AnBn =
An′
Bn′
. From the
discussion of the previous example, we adopt a ’local’ approach of convergence
of the learning dynamics. Proposition 2 characterizes the local eductive stability
condition, which can be rewritten as:
ϕ′(p) = κ{n:p≤pn0}
[
∑
n
D′n(p)∑
nD′n(p)
ϕ′n(p)
]
= κ{n:p≤pn0}
[
∑
n
αnϕ′n (pn)
]
The second equality follows from linearity, ϕ′n (p) = ϕ′n (pn) ,∀n. The factor
κ{n:p≤pn0} captures the possibility of spatial differences in the maximal willing-
nesses to pay, and is defined as:
κ{n:p≤pn0} ≡
∑
nD′n(p)∑
n:p≤pn0 D
′
n(p)
≥ 1
with ∑n:p≤pn0 D
′
n(p) =
∑
nD′n(p)1{p≤pn0}, from taking the price derivative of
the regionally integrated demand function. The denominator sums the regional
demand elasticities at the open economy equilibrium price, whenever the quan-
tities demanded are positive. The numerator sums the regional demand elastic-
ities irrespectively of whether open economy equilibrium quantities are positive
or not. Finally, whenever the consumers of all the integrating regions can afford
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consumption at the free-trade equilibrium price, the numerator and the denom-
inator of the above expression coincide and κ{n:p≤pn0} = 1. Whenever it is not
the case, κ{n:p≤pn0} > 1. Then:
Proposition 8 For N = {1, ..., N} , if ∃n, n′ ∈N :AnBn =
An′
Bn′
, then the regional
integration of autarkic expectationally stable economies can be expectationally
unstable. It is more likely so, the larger the disparity in the willingnesses to pay
across regions κ{n:p≤pn0}.
Proof. See appendix 2.
Next, we uncover a hidden destabilizing force behind the linear class of
economies N: even imposing equality of maximal willignesses to pay across
regions, the economic integration of expectationally stable regions can end up
being expectationally unstable.
4.3 What the Linear Model does not Say
Suppose that regional demand and supply schedules are allowed to be non-linear,
and index them by m ∈ M = {1, ...,M} . The following condition guarantees
that, with the appropriate boundary behaviour, the PFE are unique (both au-
tarkic and regionally integrated) and therefore (globally) determinate:
Condition (A.1.): ∀p ∈ [0, pm0 ), D′m(p) < 0, S′m(p) > 0; pm0 ≡ min (Dm)−1 (0) >
0; Sm(0) = 0; Dm(.), Sm(.) ∈ C1; ∀m ∈M.(39)
Uniqueness of the regionally integrated PFE price p then follows from (A.1.),
appropriate boundary conditions40 and from the fact that the cobweb function
is decreasing in the relevant price domain:
ϕ′ (p) =
∑
m S′m (p)∑
m:p≤pm0 D
′
m (p)
< 0,∀p ∈ [0,max
m
pm0 − ε]
Choose a CK initial price restriction that is ’close’ to the PFE price (in a
neighbourhood around it), p0 ∈ N(p) = (p− , p+ ). Whenever the learning
process converges to it, we will say that the equilibrium is locally strongly
rational (LSR). Since p is locally determinate, applying the implicit function
theorem to the market clearing equation D(p) = S(p), we obtain the following
condition characterizing the learning dynamics from proposition 2(ii) above:
lim
τ→∞
(pτ − p) =
( S′(p)
D′(p)
)τ
(p0 − p) = 0⇔ |ϕ′ (p)| =
∣∣∣∣
S′(p)
D′(p)
∣∣∣∣ < 1
39Notice that (A.1.) does not restrict the second derivatives of the supply and demand
schedules, and also that S′m(.) > 0 implies that the underlying regional costs are convex.
40The boundary conditions are: ∑m [Dm(0)− Sm(0)] > 0, and, for a small ε > 0 :∑
m
[
Dm
(
max
m
pm0 − ε
)
− Sm
(
max
m
pm0 − ε
)]
< 0.
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Since our purpose is to relate the condition for the expectational stability of the
regionally integrated equilibrium to the autarkic stability ones, we can expand
it as:
ϕ′ (p) =
∑
m S′m (p)∑
m:p≤pm0 D
′
m (p)
= κ{m:p≤pm0 }
∑
m
αm
D′m (pm)
D′m (p)
S′m (p)
S′m (pm)
ϕ′m (pm)
Where the αm ≥ 0,∀m :
∑
m αm = 1 represent the relative (to the world)
demand elasticities of each of the integrating economies evaluated at the free
trade PFE price p, αm ≡ D
′
m(p)∑
mD′m(p)
. pm is the autarky PFE price of each m
region. The factor κ{m:p≤pm0 } ≡
∑
mD
′
m(p)∑
m:p≤pm0
D′m(p)
accounts for differences in the
maximal willingnesses to pay across the integrating regions. Then:
Proposition 9 Even if there are no differences in the maximal willingnesses
to pay across regions (κ{m:p≤pm0 } = 1), the regional integration of M autarkic
expectationally stable economies can result in an expectationally unstable
PFE price.
Proof. See appendix 2.
Intuitively, the proposition states that although regional integration stabilizes
autarky prices across regions41 , it can destabilize producers’ expectations, ren-
dering more compelling the necessity of an ’exogenous price intervention’ than
it was in autarky. The study of expectational stability in the non-linear class
of economies formalizes the intuition that heterogeneity is detrimental to ex-
pectational coordination (Guesnerie’s [21], GI2), providing an open economy
interpretation of the forces behind: because economic integration equalizes pre-
trade prices across regions, it creates a redistributional conflict between hetero-
geneous producers, leading the more productive to expect higher prices, and the
less, lower ones. However now each will react differently, as optimally dictated
by the elasticity of their individual supply curves. Since the higher the degree of
heterogeneity in the responses is, the more difficult it becomes for them to indi-
vidually forecast, it is intuitive that the likelihood of successful coordination (on
the open economy PFE price) decreases. Stated more formally, as expectational
stability is characterized by a condition on first derivatives, the consequences of
policy changes upon it are characterized by a condition on second derivatives.
Second derivatives precisely measure the magnitude of the individual reactions
to the policy change which, because of its redistributive nature, embodies ex-
pectations of a different sign. Hence, the result of the proposition. The same
explanation holds for propositions 7 and 8, because differences in consumers’
willingnesses to pay allow differences in the magnitude of producers’ reactions
across regions in real cost terms, i.e. in costs per unit of regional purchas-
41 In the sense that p ∈
[
min
m
pm,maxm pm
]
. Proposition 12 in Calvo-Pardo [6] proves this
assertion in the present context.
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ing power42 . It is however absent in the linear class if maximal willingnesses
across regions are equalized, because the linear class forces the magnitude of the
individual reactions to be the same (second derivatives are zero).
5 Coordination and Welfare
An important rationale motivating open economy exercises are welfare consid-
erations. In this section we compare standard welfare gains from free trade in
partial equilibrium with the coordinational considerations studied in the previ-
ous sections. However, the nature of the exercise is necessarily from an ex-ante
viewpoint (before integration takes place) and can be described as follows: Sup-
pose that a given economy is considering with which region to integrate among
those in a given class. A possible evaluation criterion is welfare, disregarding co-
ordinational issues. Another evaluation criterion is expectational coordination.
If we compare the recommendations of both, do they coincide? The answer
illustrates the described trade-off: standard efficiency gains associated with eco-
nomic integration have to be weighted against the diminished plausibility of the
PFE price in terms of its predictability after integration, (proposition 9)43 .
Consider the linear class of economies where farmers face the same aggregate
demand function, Dn(p) = D(p),∀n, but differ in their cost structures across
regions. The integrated economy will be more efficient than the autarkic ones
if we measure efficiency by the net change in the Marshallian aggregate surplus
(net producers’ profits plus net consumers’ surplus) and this change is positive44 .
We slightly change notation relative to the previous sections: now p∗ (instead of
p) denotes the integration equilibrium price, while pn still denotes the autarkic
equilibrium price of region n. Then, the increase in welfare from integration for
a given n region is then defined by:
∆Wn ≡ W∗n −Wn = ∆CSn −∆Πn
=
∫ pn
p∗
Dn(p)dp−
∫ pn
p∗
Sn(p)dp
It can be seen that a conflict exists between the consumers and the producers
of each of the integrating economies. The economy with the relatively more
42For the sake of completeness, we let the reader remark that when differences in the maxi-
mal willingnesses to pay are allowed across economies in the non-linear classM (κ{m:p≤pm0 } ≥
1), the free trade PFE price is even more difficult to forecast. The proof follows the steps of
proposition 8 and is immediate once we notice that:
ϕ′ (p) = κ{m:p≤pm0 }
∑
m
αmϕ′m (p)
43Guesnerie [20].
44Since there are no general equilibrium effects, two economies in the class considered here
have an incentive to integrate when appropriate redistributional schemes are implemented.
For a more detailed discussion, see Mas-Colell et al. [26], section 10.E.
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performant producers45 (max
n
Cn) experiences an increase in profits (∆Πn >
0) from selling abroad part of their production at a price p∗ higher than the
autarkic one pn. This increase in the price damages the consumers living in that
region, who see their consumer surplus eroded relative to the autarkic situation,
∆CSn < 0. The converse happens in the region with the least performant
producers (min
n
Cn). But, the aggregate surplus increases after integration in
each of the integrating economies46 :
∆Wn =
∫ pn
p∗
[A−Bp]dp−
∫ pn
p∗
[Cnp] dp
=
[Ap
2
{
2− B +CnA p
}]pn
p∗
= B +Cn2 [pn − p
∗]2 > 0,∀n
Because of this fact, we can assume that national (internal lump-sum ex-post)
transfer schemes exist that are able to (more than) compensate the adversely
affected party. This is always possible in this partial equilibrium framework,
and everybody can be made strictly better off after integration47 .
From this ex-ante welfare evaluation criterion, a given economy in the linear
class would ideally choose an integration partner with which the increase in the
net aggregate surplus is maximized. Region H must decide with which of the
two region types (F or A) would it integrate, assuming that the producers in
region F are more performant than those in the H region, while those in region
A are less:
+∞ > CF > CH > CA > 0
Call the resulting integrated equilibrium prices p∗H+F and p∗H+A. From the an-
alytic expression of the net welfare gains in region n, ∆Wn, we can see that
0 ∈ arg sup
CA:CA≤CH
∆WH+AH =
B +CH
2
[
pH − p∗H+A(CA)
]2
Because, given the autarky price in the home region pH , the largest possible
value of the integrated economy equilibrium price p∗H+A is obtained when the
less performant among the abroad regions (A) is selected, i.e. as CA −→ 0.
Since the home region (H) is more efficient, autarky prices are going to be lower:
p∗H+A− pH > 0. As this difference is maximal whenever CA −→ 0, denote by ω
45Note that with the specified cost structures, ∂CfC(qf , f) = −
(
qf√
2Cf
)2
< 0. Therefore,
higher values of the cost parameter Cf correspond to lower production costs, and to a relatively
more performant production technique.
46Where CΣ =
∑
n Cn denotes the parameter of the total cost function in the integrated
economy CΣ(q). Notice that, with an abuse of notation, we denote both a given integrating
region and the summation subindex by n.
47 Individual lump-sum transfer schemes could have been implemented in the way proposed
by Dixit and Norman [11] (sec. 3.2.), since the partial equilibrium economy is a particular
case of the general equilibrium economy they consider.
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its maximum value:
ω = lim
CA−→0
p∗H+A(CA)− pH =
A
B + CH2
− AB +CH
> 0
Now, selecting among the foreign economies (F) that are more efficient than
the home region, is there one that allows the home region to attain this same
level of welfare ∆WH+AH (ω) = B+CH2 [ω]
2? Since the foreign economy (F) is
more efficient, the integrated economy equilibrium price will be lower than the
autarky equilibrium price at home (H), pH − p∗H+F > 0. Then our problem can
be stated formally as:
∃CF : pH − p∗H+F (CF ) > ω
To prove this statement, we are going to proceed as follows: first, we are going
to show that there exists a foreign region with a cost function parameter CF
such that the home economy reaches the level of welfare ∆WH+AH (ω). Then, we
are going to show that there is a set of more performant foreign regions, the
integration of home with which yields strictly larger welfare gains. Finally, we
show that as the home region becomes more efficient, it also becomes increas-
ingly difficult to find such an F-region, in the sense that the ’measure’ of the set
of F-regions the integration with which yields larger expected welfare gains for
the H-region approaches zero.
First, CF = CH
(
2 + CHB
)
satisfies the equation48 :
pH − p∗H+F (CF ) = ω =⇒ ∆WH+FH (ω) = ∆WH+AH (ω)
Second, geometrically notice that CF + CH = tan θF+H. Provided that
the home economy has an aggregate cost parameter strictly bounded from
above, CH < +∞, and that it is not ’too expectationally unstable’, CHB <
M < +∞, then CF + CH = CH
(
3 + CHB
)
will also be strictly bounded above:
arctanCH
(
3 + CHB
)
= θF+H < pi2 = arctan (+∞) . By continuity, there will
exist a δ > 0 : θF+H < θF+H + δ < pi2 which will correspond to a foreign region
with an aggregate cost parameter CF < +∞ : CF + CH = tan
[
θF+H + δ
]
=
CH
(
3 + CHB
)
+∆C and that will generate a strictly larger welfare gain for the
home economy:
∆WH+FH > ∆WH+FH (ω)⇐⇒ ∆C > 0
48For the class of linear economies considered with identical aggregate demand, the F-
region with a value of the aggregate cost parameter CF that satisfies the above equation,
must equivalently satisfy the condition:
B + CF
B + CH
= B + CH
B +CA
∣∣∣∣
CA=0
Whenever this condition is respected, the welfare gains for the home region from integrating
with a more efficient (F) or with a less efficient (A) economy are the same, for economies in
the linear class considered. Obviously the set of such F regions is of zero measure in the set
of economies considered.
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Which is true by construction. Therefore, home integration with an F-region
characterized by an aggregate cost parameter CF displays strictly larger welfare
gains than with the best possible integration partner in the set of A-regions.
Finally, under the just stated conditions, there exists an infinity of foreign
regions (F) that satisfy this condition, but the size of the set becomes smaller
the more efficient the home region is, i.e. the larger the value of the parameter
CH . If we put a uniform probability measure on
[
0, pi2
]
we can interpret the
expression
1− µ
[
θF+H
]
=
∫ pi
2
θF+H
2
pidv = 1−
arctanCH
(
3 + CHB
)
pi
2
as the likelihood of finding one such F-region the integration with which pro-
vides higher welfare gains for the home region than integration with the best
candidate in the set of A-regions. Then, from lim
CH→+∞
{
1− µ
[
θF+H
]}
= 0 we
conclude that the more efficient the home region is, the lower the probability of
finding an F-region the integration with which will yield the same welfare gains
for home than integration with the best candidate A-region (all relatively less
performant).
Now, the important point to be noted about this ex-ante welfare evaluation
of the potential partner with which to integrate is that, the less performant the
integrating partner is (the smaller the value of the aggregate cost parameter
C), the easier the coordination upon the perfect foresight equilibrium of the
integrated economy. And conversely. For a strictly finite value of CH , we also
see that the likelihood of finding such an F-region integration partner decreases
with the ’degree of expectational instability’ of the home region, as measured
by CHB . This can be seen immediately from the fact that:
∂B
{
1− µ
[
θF+H(B)
]}
= − 2pi∂BθF+H(B) =
2
pi
(CH
B
)2
1 +C2H
(
3 + CHB
)2 > 0
Therefore, the higher the degree of expectational stability of the home economy
(the higher the value of B, the lower the value of CHB ), the higher the likelihood of
finding an economy in the F-class the integration with which yields strictly larger
welfare gains than integration with an economy in the A-class49 . Therefore:
Proposition 10 In the class of linear economies with equal maximal willig-
nesses to pay: (i) If the purpose of Home economic integration is to maximize
the welfare gains, relatively more performant regions will be preferred (F-regions
will be preferred to A-regions), and government restrictions will be most likely
called for to coordinate upon the free trade equilibrium price. (ii) However, if
the objective of Home economic integration is expectational coordination, rel-
atively less performant regions will be preferred (A-regions will be preferred to
F-regions).
49Recall that regions in the A-class are those expectationally more stable than the home
economy because they face the same aggregate demand (and therefore, the same value of the
elasticity of demand B) but operate with higher costs: 1CH <
1
CA
,∀q.
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Proof. By construction.
This is a surprising conclusion, the robustness of which remains to be ascer-
tained50 ,51 .
6 Conclusion
Inspired by Deardorff’s [9] exercise, we have departed from the standard compet-
itive partial equilibrium framework substituting the central role of the Walrasian
auctioneer as a coordinating institution by a truly decentralised coordinating
device based on rational learning, perhaps endowing producers with more real-
istic abilities. Adopting the eductive learning viewpoint (Guesnerie [19],[20]),
we have shown how in a context where standard gains-from-trade exist, a free
trade policy generates multiple (rationalizable) equilibria despite of the standard
competitive equilibrium being unique. From an ex-ante viewpoint, as multiple
equilibria cannot be probabilized, trade increases the uncertainty perceived by
producers (’fear of globalisation’). We claim that this new rationale may explain
producers’ reluctance to remove trade barriers (or at least to prefer ’gradualism’
to an abrupt integration exercise, explaining the persistence ).
A testable empirical implication is that free trade may actually lead to in-
creased price dispersion rather than to convergence across regions (law of one
price, in the aggregate), as depicted in figure 5. This fact that has been recently
documented by Bergin and Glick [2], Crucini et al. [8], Engel [13] or Engel and
Rogers [14], for the EU, within the US, or the CUSTA-NAFTA trade integra-
tion experiences. A direct test of the theory presented here would rely on the
"buffer stock" theory of precautionary savings as applied to producers. If the
announcement of a free-trade policy exacerbates the uncertainty producers fore-
see, theory would predict that non-exporting firms should endow excess balance
sheet financial provisions relative to both own history (past average precaution-
ary accumulation of funds to cope with expected uncertainty) and to exporters
(which already compete abroad and therefore do not fear foreign competition
to the same extent).
Although a natural extension would be to study whether the conditions for
the eductive stability of the equilibrium in an open economy can be related to
the basic theorems of international trade, a first difficulty stems in recognizing
that most of such trade theorems concern comparative statics questions in a
general equilibrium set up. Yet, most of the conclusions on the eductive sta-
50What seems crucial for the argument to extend to non-linear schedules is the existence of
a finite maximal willingness to pay for the good.
51A caveat is in order. When the PFE price is not the unique rationalizable expectations
equilibrium price, the aggregate surplus need not be the appropriate evaluation criterion in
welfare terms. The reason is that it is based on the difference in welfare terms between the two
Nash equilibrium prices (autarkic and integration) disregarding whether they can be educed or
not. A more appropriate criterion in welfare terms would necessitate of computing producers’
welfare when the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria is not a singleton. A solution to
this serious problem (selection among a continuum of rationalizable equilibria) is beyond the
scope of the present work.
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bility literature relate to partial equilibrium economies52 ; Hopefully the results
presented here would stimulate further research along these lines.
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Appendix 0
Proof of Proposition 6
Under the condition AnBn =
An′
Bn′
= AB ,∀n,n′ ∈ N the anchorage assumption
is given by p0 = AΣBΣ =
A
B . For parts (i),(ii) compute the limit limτ→+∞pτ of
the price sequence in proposition 3 after replacing
(
− CΣBn0
)
by
(
−CΣBΣ
)
, and
An0
Bn0
by AΣBΣ . To prove part (iii) notice that D(p) =
∑
nDn(p) implies that
D′(p) =∑nD′n(p) ≤ 0 by D′n(p) ≤ 0,∀n. Also, S(p) =
∑
n Sn(p) implies that
S′(p) = ∑n S′n(p) > 0 by S′n(p) > 0,∀n. The linearity of the regional demand
and supply schedules implies that: D′n(p1) = D′n(p2), S′n(p1) = S′n(p2),∀n and
∀p1, p2 ∈ [0, p0), ∀p1, p2 ∈ [p0,+∞), . From part (i) in proposition 2, |ϕ′(p)| =∣∣∣ S
′(p)
D′(p)
∣∣∣ < 1,∀p. Expanding the sums and using the linearity, we can rewrite
it as |ϕ′(p)| =
∣∣∣
∑
n
D′n(p)
D′(p)
S′n(p)
D′n(p)
∣∣∣ = |
∑
n αnϕ′n(p)| < 1,∀p. Since ∀n, αn ≥ 0,∑
n αn = 1, the regional integration expectational stability condition is a convex
combination of the autarkic expectational stability conditions. Therefore:
min
n
|ϕ′n (p)| ≤ |ϕ′ (p)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
n
αnϕ′n (p)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
n
|ϕ′n (p)|
implies that if the autarkically most unstable region is expectationally stable,
so must the regional integration be:
max
n
|ϕ′n (p)| < 1 =⇒ |ϕ′ (p)| < 1
That the converse is not true follows trivially from the convex combination set
of inequalities above.Q.E.D.
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Appendix 1
We completely characterize the learning dynamics of proposition 7. The
results are summarized in Table A4.1, and the definitions of the symbols imme-
diately follow:
Table A4.1: Summary of Results of Proposition 7
CΣ
> [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] ∅
= C1Σ [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0] [0, p0]
∅
∅
∅
≥ {p} {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P
{p}|P
[0, p0]
[0, p0]
∅
= C0Σ {p} {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P
{p}|P
[0, p0]
[pc1, pc2]
[pc1, pc2] ∅
> {p} {p} {p}
{p}
{p}
[pc1, pc2]
[pc1, pc2] [pc1, pc2] ∅
= C2Σ {p} {p}
{p}
{p}
[pc1, pc2]|
[pc1, pc2]| [pc1, pc2]| [pc1, pc2]| ∅
> {p}
{p}
{p}
{p}
{p} {p} {p} {p} ∅
0
∅
∅
∅
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅


CΣ > CΣ
CΣ = CΣ
CΣ < CΣ

 0 < = C2Σ < = C0Σ ≤ C1Σ = CΣ
The contents, following the results of proposition 2, indicate the set of
rationalizable-expectations equilibria, where the exogenous price restriction p0
is embedded in the model (it is the maximum willingness to pay of the integrated
economy demand):
-” [0, p0] ”means that the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria usually
contains the whole price domain [0, p0]. As farmers learn nothing, p is not an
SREE;
-” [pc1, pc2] ” means that the set of rationalizable prices is the whole segment
[pc1, pc2] ⊃ p, where pc2 = ϕ(pc1), ϕ2(pct) = pct, t = 1, 2 define cycles of or-
der two of the cobweb function. For some parameterizations, the embedded
price restriction p0 can belong to the set [pc1, pc2] . Then, an exogenous price
invertevention is called for restricting p0 to be out of it: p0 /∈ [pc1, pc2] , denoting
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such a requirement by ” [pc1, pc2]| ”,meaning ’[pc1, pc2] is the set of rationalizable
prices conditional to that price restriction’.
-” {p} ” means that the only rationalizable-expectations price equilibrium is
the PFE p, and p is an SREE.
-” {p}|P ” means that the only rationalizable-expectations price equilibrium
is the PFE p conditional to an exogenous price intervention restricting the nat-
ural one p0 to be in the basin of attraction53 of p, P (p) = (pc1, pc2) \ {p} , and
p is an ’SREE conditional to that price restriction’.
As the characterization of ϕ2(.) depends on pi′, pi the learning dynamics will
ultimately depend on whether CΣ  CΣ, since from the definitions of pi′, pi
and their properties we know that they depend on the value of the aggregate
cost parameter CΣ. In principle, CΣ ∈ R++. We are going to divide the CΣ-
parameter space in four regions according to the following definitions of C0Σ, C1Σ
and C2Σ satisfying:
+∞ > C1Σ ≥ C0Σ > C2Σ > 0
With C1Σ ≡ BΣ characterizing the limit value of the aggregate cost parameter
above which the PFE price p becomes eductively unstable; C0Σ ≡ B2
[
1 + A1A2
]
satisfies lim
A2
B2
→A1B1
C1Σ = C0Σ so that the whole region
[
C0Σ, C1Σ
]
collapses into that
value
{
C0Σ
}
. Finally C2Σ ≡ B2 characterizes the limit value of the aggregate
cost parameter below which the PFE price p becomes eductively stable, i.e. if
C2Σ > CΣ > 0 =⇒ p is globally an SREE. Since the difference in the maximal
willingnesses to pay is measured by the parameter CΣ, its range of variation
will also be constrained to the regions for CΣ(54). We allow the possibility that
0 = CΣ because it corresponds to the case studied in proposition 6.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 8
Since ∃n, n′ ∈N :AnBn =
An′
Bn′
, assume that there exists a region the consumers
of which will not be able to afford the consumption of the crop at the prevailing
PFE price p, we have that:
∑
n:p≤pn0
D′n(p) ≥
∑
n
D′n (p) =⇒
∑
nD′n(p)∑
n:p≤pn0 D
′
n(p)
[
∑
n
αnϕ′n (pn)
]
≤
∑
n S′n (p)∑
nD′n (p)
=
∑
n
αnϕ′n (pn)
Taking absolute values on both sides:
|ϕ′ (p)| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
n
αnϕ′n (pn)
∣∣∣∣∣
53The basin of attraction P (p) of a given equilibrium price p is composed by the union of
all the p0 = p s.t. limτ−→+∞ϕ
τ (p0) = p.
54With the exception introduced by property 3 of the (second) intersecting price pi′ accord-
ing to which 0 ≤ CΣ < C1Σ. Details are in appendix 2.
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So that when differences in the maximal willingness to pay for the crop exist
(LHS), the PFE price is ’more unstable’ than when they do not exist (RHS-
proposition 6). But we can measure by how much, since:
|ϕ′ (p)| < 1⇐⇒
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
n
αnϕ′n (pn)
∣∣∣∣∣
<
∑
n:p≤pn0 D
′
n(p)∑
nD′n(p)
≡ 1κ{n:p≤pn0}
With κ{n:p≤pn0} ≥ 1, taking value 1 when the integration equilibrium price p
is low enough so that the consumers of all the integrating regions can afford to
pay it (the situation in proposition 6): i.e. ∑n:p≤pn0 D
′
n(p) =
∑
nD′n(p). Then
the conditions of proposition 6 are strengthened to:
κ{n:p≤pn0}minn |ϕ
′
n (pn)| ≤ |ϕ′ (p)| ≤ κ{n:p≤pn0}maxn |ϕ
′
n (pn)|
Meaning that even if all autarkic price equilibria are expectationally stable, so
that max
n
|ϕ′n (pn)| < 1, the PFE price p can fail to be so whenever:
κ{n:p≤pn0} >
1
max
n
|ϕ′n (pn)|
=⇒ |ϕ′ (p)| > max
n
|ϕ′n (pn)|
i.e. whenever there are sufficient economies the consumers of which cannot afford
to pay the international price for the crop. The smaller the set of the economies
in which consumers demand the crop at the international price {n : p ≤ pn0} ,
the smaller the elasticity of the integration aggregate demand, the larger the
value of κ{n:p≤pn0} above one, and the more likely becomes the above inequality.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, if there are no differences in the maximal willingnesses to pay across
regions, κ{n:p≤pn0} = 1 and ϕ
′ (p) = ∑m αmϕ′m (p) . Although for non-linear
economies ϕ′m (p) = ϕ′m (pm) since
ϕ′m (p) =
D′m (pm)
D′m (p)
S′m (p)
S′m (pn)
ϕ′m (pm)
we can rather expand ϕ′m (.) as:
ϕ′m (p) = ϕ′m (pm) + (p− pm)
∫ 1
0
ϕ′′m [pm + ζ(p− pm)] dζ
Which plugged into ϕ′ (p) yields:
ϕ′ (p) =
∑
m
αmϕ′m (pm) +
∑
m
αm(p− pm)
∫ 1
0
ϕ′′m [pm + ζ(p− pm)] dζ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡R≷0
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Then ϕ′ (p) − R = ∑m αmϕ′m (pm) , which is a convex combination of the au-
tarkic stability conditions. Therefore, taking absolute values on both sides:
min
m
|ϕ′m (pm)| ≤ |ϕ′ (p)−R| ≤ maxm |ϕ
′
m (pm)|
Using the property that |ϕ′ (p)−R| ≥ ||ϕ′ (p)| − |R|| and adding + |R| to both
sides of the second inequality in the above expression, we obtain:
|ϕ′ (p)| = ||ϕ′ (p)| − |R|+ |R|| ≤ ||ϕ′ (p)| − |R||+ |R| ≤ max
m
|ϕ′m (pm)|+ |R|
Reaching the desired conclusion, for even ifmax
m
|ϕ′m (pm)| < 1, so that all autar-
kic integrating economies are expectationally stable, the regional integration of
them need not because max
m
|ϕ′m (pm)| ≤ maxm |ϕ
′
m (pm)|+ |R| and it can happen
that |ϕ′ (p)| > max
m
|ϕ′m (pm)| even if maxm |ϕ
′
m (pm)| < 1 (even without differ-
ences in the maximal willingnesses to pay across regions). Finally, notice that
for economies in the linear class N of proposition 6, R = 0 so that this propo-
sition extends the results obtained there. But as well, notice that even in the
non-linear case it can happen that R = 0, as it is the case when the integrating
economies are identical (proposition 9 above). Q.E.D.
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